Nietzsche's Übermensch is not über Alles

I. The "free spirit par excellence" is distinct from "we free spirits" One of the most detailed portraits of "the free spirit par excellence" is provided in section 347 of The Gay Science. Nietzsche speaks there in categorical terms and emphasizes the total "freedom of the will" which allows "the spirit ... [to] take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty." He stresses the capacity of this spirit for "dancing even near abysses," namely for being able to be genuinely creative even in times of cultural and intellectual crisis, when no rational criteria are valid anymore, and when there is no metaphysical or transcendental guarantee for any truth or world-view. In the same section, another essential characteristic of the free spirit par excellence is depicted: its "power of self-determination," which successfully resists any external foci for its personal identity. In Nietzsche's words, it manifests complete freedom from "a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." Such spirits spontaneously create their own personal authenticity by employing the aesthetic model for self-creation – spontaneous creation of their own selves as the artists create their unique masterpieces. One's heritage or the ethos into which one was born should not determine one's identity and authenticity. 1


PhaenEx
Nietzsche clearly distinguishes between those who belong to the category of "wir freien Geister " (Kritische 62; vol.5, sec.44) and the unique and genuine "free spirits par excellence."There is a qualitative leap from the first type to the second, not merely a quantitative difference of being more free in more fields of life and thought.These "very free spirits ... will not be merely free spirits but something more, higher, greater, and thoroughly different" (Beyond sec.44).In contradistinction to those few sublime figures, "we spirits" are just "their heralds and precursors." 2 But the main difference between both types is not that the first are just the "heralds" of the second; rather it lies in the dependence of "we free spirits" on culture and society.Even if Nietzsche strove to overcome most of the "modern ideas" and ideologies that prevailed in his time, he admits that "even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine" (Science sec.344).And even if Nietzsche did his utmost to overcome his cultural-philosophical heritage, he needed it as the object of his overcoming.Thus, he was dialectically dependent upon this very heritage.
In Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Nietzsche suggests that the highly developed spiritual and intellectual component of power may weaken even the most superior personality.Individuals who are genuinely free and independent are unlikely to adhere to any rigid and inflexible set of norms: the values they possess are constantly open to examination and susceptible to being "overcome."Their freedom from any given tradition induces a kind of vulnerability, and they are susceptible to manipulation and exploitation: Compared with him who has tradition on his side and requires no reasons for his actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially in actions; for he is aware of too many motives and points of view and therefore possesses an uncertain and unpracticed hand.What means are there of nonetheless rendering him relatively strong?How does the strong spirit come into being?(Human vol. 1, sec.230).
The problem may be recast as that of turning purely spiritual power into a concrete historical force: is it possible to preserve the spirit of Hamlet in the body of Faust?Nietzsche's solution focuses on the social fabric, which is woven with religious and moral dogmas, and which produces a psychological pattern of guilt, asceticism, ressentiment, and bad conscience.All of them are responsible for the corruption of spiritual power and cultural achievements.And Nietzsche wanted to weaken, or in his words to "freeze" these destructive manifestations of human psyche in order to pave the way for genuine freedom, personal authenticity and positive, mature and creative spiritual power. 3However, by emphasizing these elements, Nietzsche admits that there can be no absolute autonomy; even the most powerful are not impervious to the influence of the environment with which they interact.The revaluation of prevalent cultural norms is essential to the evolution of the psychology of the Übermensch because even the arena of the "authentic legislator" is penetrated by environmental values and forces.Hence it becomes clear that the Übermensch type is essentially different from that of the "free spirit par excellence."The latter, namely the absolutely autonomous will to power, is therefore no more than a regulative ideal -one that provides the model for approximation, but which can in principle never be fully realized in human society.
It follows that Nietzsche, dependent upon the tradition he strove to overcome and conscious of his dependence, could not honestly regard himself as a "free spirit par excellence," i.e., as absolutely independent of any historical and cultural context which hovers, PhaenEx as it were, above the contemporary manifestations of social ethos and modes of thought.
Nietzsche clearly perceives himself to belong solely to the category of "we spirits."What this means is that Nietzsche delineated an essential distinction between the human free spirits like himself and a few others, and the ideal free spirit, which he calls the "free spirit par excellence."Moreover, "we free spirits" are not equal to the spirit of the Übermensch who, like the free spirit par excellence, personifies the qualitative jump from being a humanely free spirit to manifesting it in an übermenschlich way.
The type "we free spirits" thus indicates a humanely possible stage on the way to becoming the Übermensch but in no way can its members attain the highest status of the free spirit par excellence.This Nietzschean intuition is also expressed in the grammatically plural "we," in contradistinction to the singular "spirit par excellence."Let us remind ourselves in this context that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is subtitled: A Book for all and None.Everybody can aspire to belong, like Nietzsche, to the distinguished elite group of "we spirits" but no one can reach the exalted and most sublime status of the "free spirit par excellence."

II. The Übermensch is not the free spirit par excellence
Nietzsche claims that even the Übermensch depends on society, which should draw upon all its resources in order to cultivate him.Hence his statement that man is the bridge between the ape and the Übermensch, and his admission regarding the ideal of the Übermensch, which has hitherto been a mere dream … [of which] as yet history does not offer us any certain examples.Nevertheless history might one day give birth to such people tooonce a great many favorable preconditions have been created and determined (Science sec.288).
One cannot find in Nietzsche's writings a similar statement about the possibility that in the future people who manifest the patterns of the "free spirit par excellence" will emerge.
The free spirit par excellence does not need society for its cultivation and sustenance.It emerges spontaneously by the power of its mental resources and by sheer luck.It resembles the Spinozistic causa sui and hence it is this figure, rather than the figure of the Übermensch, that must emerge after the "death of God."After pronouncing that "God is dead," it is to this ideal that Nietzsche refers when he exclaims: "Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?"(Science 125).The essential difference between the Übermensch and the "free spirit par excellence" is clear in Nietzsche's view that a society of the Übermenschen is not impossible, but a viable social nexus consisting solely of free spirits par excellence is impossible.
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche embarked upon the genealogical inquiry to examine whether the emphasis upon the immanence, autarchy and extreme individuality of authentically powerful persons is compatible with a social context.The genealogical account shows that the moral patterns of positive power were occasionally manifested within this or that social and historical context, though not always in their most perfect or distinct forms.It also shows that factors external to these patterns (like Christianity) were responsible for their disappearance.Nietzsche's affirmation of society as the necessary condition for the materialization of positive power emphasizes his extreme individualism.And since Nietzsche affirms "a community" (e.g., second essay of Genealogy, sec.9), and does not seek to destroy it, he had to explain how the übermenschlich patterns of behavior or the morality of positive power are possible within a social context.He analyses the nature of the interaction among the PhaenEx members of society and maintains that genuine justice is possible only within a social fabric composed of equally powerful members: Justice ... is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an `understanding' by means of a settlement -and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves (sec.8).
Nietzsche argues that the powerful individual is characterized by egoism.This emphasis on the egoism of genuine mental power, however, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to describe the moral and social network of powerful individuals who would willingly and freely enter the restrictive social framework.In Beyond Good and Evil (sec.264), for example, Nietzsche declares that recognition of the value and freedom of others originates in egoism.
Only an individual who freely expresses an abundance of positive power and a firm selfhood is able to grant similar rights and freedoms to all those who are recognized by him as equals.
He or she is not afraid that this might diminish or destroy his or her own power.It is self-affirmation and the confidence in one's power and virtues that enables the affirmation of "others" and their uniqueness.In Nietzsche's eyes, human egoism and the emphasis on selfhood do not contradict the moral order; they actually create the ideal conditions for its proper functioning.
At this point a question arises: why do the powerful need a society at all?Is it not the case that the need of others indicates weakness and insufficiency?In answer, one may point out that the powerful person is not identical with an omnipotent and absolutely perfect God, capable of functioning fully and freely apart from his creation.There is no upper limit to power and there is no optimum for absolute autarchy and self-sufficiency.Moreover, cultural enterprises require the association and collaboration of various creative powers, each contributing its distinct capacities to the common enterprise.To make the social manifestation of power possible, any creation, even the most individual, needs the social fabric and the mutual exchange of ideas and concepts.There is no power without creation and form giving, and there is no creation without society.Hence there is no power without society, and its essential manifestations are impossible if there is a complete severance from the social context. 4rthermore, since absolute power never actually "exists," and since there is no creation ex nihilo, persons possessing positive powers, namely "we free spirits" (and this includes, by extrapolation, the Übermenschen) need each other, and need society and culture as the vital working framework within which they create.Obviously society itself also requires moral patterns that organize and consolidate it.Nietzsche, then, is not a negating "nihilist" who wishes to overthrow society and go beyond its limits.The "Antichrist" within him does not turn him into an anarchist, nor does it make him immoral.This is especially due to his anthropological concept of "Macht." 5 Because of the unattainable ideality of the "free spirit par excellence," Nietzsche dwells more on the figure of the Übermensch.However, he believes that it is necessary to introduce the first type as well because in this way he provides the upper limit, which, though unattainable by humans, may endow with some degree of viable credibility his other more attainable ideals: those of the Overman and the authentically powerful person.And thus the ideal of "the free spirit par excellence" is used to give his readers the sense that the other ideals, which are less lofty, are indeed within their reach.The genuinely powerful persons and the Übermensch become realizable and the readers' sense of their viability is aroused by PhaenEx specific descriptions of their modes, especially those that portray the feasible patterns of "we free spirits." Nietzsche's descriptions of the antithesis to "we free spirits" in Beyond Good and Evil indicate that these "falsely so-called 'free spirits'" are "eloquent and prolific"; "scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its 'modern ideas,'" they seek "the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and easier life for everyone."They most often exhibit their worry for "equality of rights" and sympathy for all that suffers" (sec.44).The fact that Nietzsche provides antitheses to "we free spirits" and to the figure of the Übermensch (in the figure of "the last man," e.g., in "Zarathustra's Prologue," Zarathustra sec.5), but does not find it necessary to do so in respect of the "free spirit par excellence," is yet more evidence of the latter's essentially unique nature.

III. Negative versus positive power patterns
To clarify the exact standing of the category of "we free spirits" within Nietzschean anthropological philosophy I will now present in a nutshell his distinction between two basic patterns of persons -one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from its absence: There are recipes for the feeling of power (Gefühle der Macht), firstly for those who can control themselves and who are thereby accustomed to a feeling of power; [and secondly] for those in whom precisely this is lacking (Daybreak sec.65, my italics).
Consequently, he describes two distinct psychological types who manifest their respective kinds of power in everyday patterns of life and intellectual activity.This (at first) anthropological principle and its two diametrically opposed manifestations are the ground for his evaluations of human beings.Thus Nietzsche posits two basic patterns of moral behavior: one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from its absence (allied with the will to achieve it).The will to attain power always lies beneath the surface of all the spiritual expressions of humanity.
We should note, however, that his distinction between negative and positive powers is abstract and pictures consolidated ideal types of the various power vectors within the single individual (Beyond sec.260).Humanity does not possess a pattern of either positive or negative power par excellence, as if one of these were a definite and permanent socio-economic condition or achievement.The two vectors of power and their opposing manner of operation constitute alternating sentiments and different types of pathos in permanent conflict and fluctuation within "a single soul" and character (sec.260).Thus any morality and any society necessarily manifest both the negative aspects of repression and violence as well as the positive dimensions of sublimation and creativity.Every individual living within the social and moral framework is necessarily a slave, repressing a part (or most) of his or her drives; yet he or she is also a master, creating values and sublimating power.
Eventually, Nietzsche identifies power with life and growth and with one's ability to overcome the weakest elements of one's personality.Negative power is symptomatic of a weak personality, lacking in power but incessantly attempting to obtain it (Daybreak sec.65).
Disguised cruelty and its perverse pleasure are called upon only to reinforce an unstable character.Negative power does not express itself spontaneously, but derivatively: it is fundamentally deficient and defective, striving to encourage and fortify itself by enjoyment obtained from abuse and cruelty.misunderstood as a kind of Übermensch but solely as a "free spirit" together with Goethe and a few others.
We are now in a position to delineate Nietzsche's main typology and its inner hierarchy.First, at the bottom of Nietzsche's scale of moral evaluations there are our "humanall-too-human" basic drives, natural inclinations, psychological handicaps and many common petty traits.Then, there are the negative power patterns of the mentality of the slaves, which were mainly (but not only) predominant in early Christianity with its ascetic manifestations.
Opposite these creatively sterile, inferior people, of which the majority of the Judeo-Christian Culture consists, were those few who manifested the positive power patterns of the masters who knew how to sublimate their physical strength (Kraft) into Macht, i.e., into a spiritual superiority of masters and genuine creators.This category is actually synonymous with what Nietzsche called "we free spirits."On the penultimate step of the human pyramid stands the Übermensch, who is dependent on society for its emergence and cultivation.Finally at the very top, aloof and sublime, in an a-social vacuum hovers the ideal figure of the "the free spirit par excellence" which is essentially different from the Übermensch; one can actually refer to it as to the positive power par excellence.

IV. The explicit non-viability of the "free spirit par excellence"
Significantly, Nietzsche himself has several reservations about the existential viability of his highest ideal, the "free spirit par excellence."There exists a record of Nietzsche's conversations in the winter of 1883/84 with Joseph Paneth -a Jewish scientist from Austria who was also a friend of Freud. 6Nietzsche and Paneth discussed the PhaenEx possibility of the "regeneration" and the revival of the Jewish people in Palestine.
Nietzsche was not happy at all regarding the prospect of Jews estranging themselves from their Jewish history by becoming completely assimilated within the European nations, since such "free spirits detached from anything are dangerous and destructive" (Förster-Nietzsche 575, my translation).Nietzsche added that one should not ignore the "impact of nationality" and, according to Paneth, he was "quite disappointed that I did not wish to hear anything about the restoration of a Palestinian state" (575, my translation).And since Nietzsche speaks here about a "spirit" detached from anything whatsoever, clearly he is thinking about the more ideal type of the "free spirit," namely the free spirit par excellence.
Let us not forget that Nietzsche hardly ever promoted any ideal of nationality in his writings and reacted to the idea of a totalitarian modern state as to "the coldest of all cold monsters." 7He was against nationalism (of the Bismarckian kind) and tried to promote a supra-national culturally united Europe.Hence it follows that in his warning to Paneth he had in mind the whole cultural-historical context of a people, not solely the Jewish one. 8 any case, Nietzsche admits here that the "free spirits par excellence" are more than not communicative; they are also "dangerous and destructive."Destructive toward themselves -i.e., self-destructive -and crucially they are dangerous to others.He admits here that "free spirits par excellence" cannot establish a viable society and cannot enter into meaningful interactions with other people, especially with types of their own kind.Hence, once again, we reach the conclusion that a society that consists mainly or entirely of "free spirits par excellence" cannot be a viable one.
We must bear in mind that even Nietzsche was not a pure Nietzschean.His ideal type, the a-historical "free spirit par excellence" was solely a regulative ideal.The ideal was, among other things, a means to provide an antidote to the tendency of Germans to fill the existential void incurred by the death of (belief in) God by embracing extreme ideological and political substitutes (like Communism or Nationalism).By means of this ideal he strove to fight the dangerous Hegelian and historicist tendencies prevalent in contemporary German culture.In his essay "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life," he did not object to the use of the past for the service of life in the present.He argued only against a past that overpowers the present and annihilates any of its novel and vital elements, so that, inter alia, it also destroys the future.More vitality and less historicity was his prescription in this essay.For Nietzsche "we free spirits" are not individuals who act in an a-historical vacuum, or a kind of existential tabula rasa without memories, identity, or sensibilities rooted in their culture, heritage, and people.Nietzsche did not believe that one could succeed in severing all his or her linkages with previous history. 9He only attacked the popular illusion that it was possible to detach oneself completely from tradition, to become a "free spirit" by rejecting one's entire past.For psychological reasons Nietzsche did not believe that such a "liberation" was even feasible, let alone desirable.He was not at all reluctant to oppose either the metaphysical traditions of the past or the accepted Christian ethic.But neither did he profess to be a nihilist or seek a complete break with the past and its values.Nor was he a radical revolutionary, freed of the restraints of tradition, and descending into the historical arena from an a-temporal, a-historical pinnacle.
Nietzsche's commitment was to a path of self-transformation that is arduous and PhaenEx painstaking; for him the rigors of self-education and the anguish of self-conquest constitute a process of slow and difficult evolution.He believed in a steady educational advance, devoid of grand illusions, which only gradually leads one to new patterns of life and thought.It goes without saying, that in any social-historical context one cannot free oneself absolutely from one's own history, heritage and linguistic culture, and float in thin air as it were.Hence nobody can become "a free spirit par excellence," but one may become a part of the nexus of "we free spirits."However, what about the viability of the Übermensch?

V. Is the ideal of the Overman existentially viable?
I argued that Nietzsche believed that although the lofty ideal of the "free spirit par excellence" is not existentially viable, at least the ideal of the Übermensch is.But can he really claim that such is the case?From the fact that Nietzsche held that the Übermensch needs society for its breeding it does not follow that the Overman is able to subsist within society.And despite my earlier claim that perhaps Nietzsche introduced the unattainable ideal of the "free spirit par excellence" in order to place into sharp relief the viability of the Übermensch, I still would like to argue now that this so-called less lofty ideal is impossible as well.If this is true then Nietzsche's morality suffers from a cardinal flaw: it cannot on principle be existentially implemented and Nietzsche's 'ought' can never become a viable 'is.' Nietzsche claimed that the Übermensch is devoid of negative power factors like Schuld (guilt feelings), 'bad conscience' and ressentiment.However, he perceives the Overman as necessarily living in a society.But according to his own genealogical investigations it is precisely society which is responsible for the emergence of such negative factors in each of its members (see especially the second essay of Genealogy which is concerned with the genesis of "Guilt, Bad Conscience and the Like").Hence a pure Übermensch is impossible and we can speak only of relative qualities of positive versus negative spiritual and mental powers in each of us.

VI. Conclusion
To clarify the above I will draw an analogy with the domain of psychoanalysis.If neurosis is, as Freud claimed, a natural outcome of repressive society, and if society is necessarily founded upon repression, can we imagine a society where there are no repressed -i.e., neurotic -people?This question remains valid even for a society in which all neurotic individuals have successfully undergone psychoanalytic treatment.For when they try to live in society under more or less the same conditions that caused their neurosis in the first place, will they not regress to some degree?The same considerations are relevant with respect to the individual whose quest for authenticity or for optimal positive power -in the form of the Übermenschis supposedly finally fulfilled.Since such a person continues to be a member of society, the processes of social conditioning and the assault from within on one's 'pure power' will continue to exert their anti authenticating and weakening effects.Hence the struggles to attain personal authenticity or the Übermensch status face what seems to be a paradoxical situation: these lofty ideals cannot be materialized without society, but neither can they be lived within its framework.PhaenEx Nietzsche was well aware of the difficulty of trying to allow for the 'ought' of the übermenschlich authenticity within the social 'is.'The fact is that he leaves this issue intentionally vague in the closing sentence of Zarathustra, where Zarathustra, who personifies the ideal of personal authenticity, leaves his "cave" in order to do … what?To return to society?It is far from clear: "thus spoke Zarathustra, and he left his cave, glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains."The explicit presence of the "sun" implies that Zarathustra, not being able to become part of the human-social nexus, is like the sun, which not being part of the earth, only warms it from above.Hence Zarathustra can only inspire us to try and become authentic, to be freer than we are, to be mentally and intellectually more powerful and creative than we are at present.

Notes
This essay is a concise version of papers presented in October to the Departments of Philosophy of University of Toronto and Brock University.I am obliged to those who invited me and to the many helpful comments of the attending students.A more elaborated and extensive version of this paper is forthcoming in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies.