Heidegger’s Naturalism: 
A Retrieval of Lost Beginnings?

An Encounter with:

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Can Heidegger be naturalized? That is the question. It may seem rather strange to pose this question among phenomenologists and continental philosophers, especially since naturalism as a term first coined by Quine generally refers to “the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described” (Quine 21). If we are to assume that Heidegger’s thinking does indeed contain some form of naturalism, should Heidegger thereby be assimilated to contemporary trends in the natural and social sciences for the sake of developing a more naturalized phenomenology? These questions will no doubt find resistance among orthodox scholars of Heidegger, and even among Heidegger himself, who was adamantly opposed to all forms of scientific naturalism. However, can we claim that a non-reductive naturalism exists within Heidegger’s preoccupations with Aristotle, Jacob von Uexküll, and Nietzsche that might point the way to more robust ontology of life? If we are to concur with Heidegger’s own teacher, Husserl, that the task of philosophy is indeed to be accomplished as a rigorous science, might we apply this same scientific rigor to Heidegger’s own thinking? (Husserl 71)

It is the central claim of David E. Storey’s extraordinarily rich and insightful book that Heidegger establishes the foundation for a non-reductive naturalism that can support environmental philosophy and ethics but not without the vital assistance of Nietzsche. As Aristotle reminds us that being is said in many ways (*pollachos legomenon*), we might say that naturalism too is open to interpretation (Cox 5-7). If we are to contrast the scientific naturalism of Quine who subscribes to the orientation to reduce philosophy to science with the alleged anti-scientism of Heidegger, how
might we construe the kind of non-reductive naturalism that Storey proposes? Here, Storey constructively follows Ted Benton’s guiding idea:

A non-reductionist naturalism, making use of the ideas of a hierarchy of more or less autonomous levels of organization of matter, each with its own, qualitatively new, “emergent” powers or properties has been one fruitful way of maintaining the insights of a naturalistic approach, without falling foul of what is valid in the anti-naturalist critique. Such hierarchical, “emergent powers” ontologies enable their advocate to recognize in various subject matters of the different natural and social sciences more or less discrete and autonomous object-domains, while at the same time making no concessions to spiritualistic, vitalist, or supernatural beliefs (Storey 5).

Although Storey rightfully claims that Quine’s version of a reductive scientific naturalism only leads to nihilism where nature comes to be characterized as “a sum of material objects capable of mathematical description and manipulation by human artifice” (4), does non-reductive naturalism lead us out of this quandary by posing an alternative to the human all too human dominion over nature? How are we to cure ourselves of this nihilism, especially the mass denial and failure to act upon our own ecological predicament? Can we overcome this nihilism by turning to Nietzsche as the more viable option for establishing a new vision of environmental ethics or might we return to Heidegger in order to retrieve another meaning of nature? Confronted with these rather vexing questions, Storey decides not to pursue the meaning of nature in Heidegger’s later thinking which according to his own assessment leads to intractable problems for his label as a naturalist. Instead, Storey pursues Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle, Uexküll, and Nietzsche in order to develop a more robust philosophical biology that would sufficiently accommodate a naturalistic ontology of life. From this engagement, Storey develops three threads that guide the trajectory of his book:

1. In Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Heidegger finds a path towards establishing the intentionality of organisms and fitting humans along a continuum with other living things.

2. From Uexküll, Heidegger adopts a novel conception of the organism’s relation to its environment that resists mechanism in biology.

3. Through Nietzsche, he sees the attempt to overcome nihilism through a life-affirming vision of humanity’s place in nature and a recognition of the organic basis of value (6).

In what follows, I shall attempt to retrieve each of these threads in order to evaluate Storey’s overriding claim that Heidegger can be naturalized. First, I shall begin by exploring the latent resources in Heidegger’s interpretation of *De Anima* for developing such a view regarding the intentionality of organisms and the continuity of humans.
with other living beings. Second, I shall turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of Uexküll in his 1929-1930 lecture course, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, (FCM) to consider how the problem of animal life is developed by his resistance to mechanism. Third, I shall conclude by retrieving Heidegger’s own confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche to consider a) how nihilism can be overcome by establishing life as the basis for ontology and b) what this shift might mean for the future of environmental philosophy.

I.

After setting the stage in chapter 1 by recounting the traditional reading of Heidegger’s relevance to environmental philosophy and ethics, namely by turning to those commentators who provide the most robust account of his engagement or lack of engagement with nature, Storey turns to Heidegger’s interpretation of *De Anima* as the most promising opportunity for developing an ontology of life.¹ Throughout the early seminars and lecture courses of the 1920s, Heidegger engages Aristotle’s account of the nature of the soul as a forerunner to a phenomenological account of intentionality and begins to inquire whether life can be distinct from being as such. Although Storey is careful to claim that Heidegger’s view of human life is distinct from his view of animality, Storey’s attribution of this view to Heidegger is conceptually problematic. In the earliest 1921 seminar devoted to *De Anima*, Heidegger investigates the phenomenon of life in all animated or ensouled beings, including plants, animals, and humans, rather than subscribing to any strict hierarchical difference between them.² Here Heidegger is primarily interested in exploring life as a kind of self-movement, a directedness towards the world, and whether such a directedness in the most rudimentary sense reflects the phenomenon of intentionality.

By engaging both Brentano and Husserl’s accounts of intentionality, Heidegger explores what might be called a primordial intentionality (*Ur-intentionalität*) for the sake of opening up the possibility of developing an ontology of life which might even precede an ontology of human being or Dasein. Storey’s own distinction between animal life and human factual life does not sufficiently clarify how the phenomenon of facticity originates out of and through his investigations into animal life, especially since facticity itself cannot be easily distinguished from the

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¹ Storey cites numerous authors who have attempted to gauge Heidegger’s relevance to environmental philosophy and ethic (including Jonas, Löwith, Kohak, Llewelyn, Krell, Haar, and Zimmerman).

² See the unpublished 1921 seminar course devoted to *De Anima* available in the Helene Weiss archive at Stanford University.
essential movedness of life \textit{writ large}. As Heidegger consistently reminds us throughout the early lecture courses devoted to Aristotle, the problem of facticity is a \textit{kinesis}-problem (Heidegger, \textit{Phenomenological} 87). In the 1921-1922 lecture course, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle}, Heidegger describes the movement of factical life according to three theses summarized by David Farrell Krell, “The whole of life, as the temporal process of a bounded stretch of possibilities that we shape and that shape and befall us…” (Krell 39). If we are to claim that (1) the whole of life has a temporal cohesion that is bound and finite, and (2) that this cohesion consists of a set of possibilities, that (3) we shape and that befall us, the question remains whether these theses originate from Heidegger’s engagement with the movement of animal life rather than human life. If this is the case, factical life provides us with an even stronger justification for establishing a continuum between Dasein and non-human animals.

Although Storey indicates that Heidegger develops such a conception of animal Dasein in the 1924 lecture course, \textit{Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy}, and the 1926 lecture course, \textit{Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy}, Storey’s chapter critically omits Heidegger’s inaugural 1921 seminar on \textit{De Anima} which provides the first sketch of the roles of \textit{nous}, \textit{aesthesis}, and \textit{logos} for developing an ontology of life. Here Heidegger unearths the central concepts of Aristotle’s psychology and applies them to the ontological framework of movement (\textit{kinesis}) in the 1922 essay, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation}.\footnote{“Aristotle’s ethics is then to be placed into this ontological horizon [of the first part], such that this ethics is seen as the explication of beings in the sense of human beings, i.e., human life and its movement. This is done in such a way that we first provide an interpretation of \textit{De Anima}…indeed this itself is carried out on the broader basis of an explication of the domain of being of life as a particular kind of movement (i.e. on the basis of an interpretation of \textit{De Motu Animalium} [On the Motion of Animals])” (Heidegger, \textit{Supplements} 143).} Heidegger’s crucial interpretation of \textit{De Anima} deserves to be more rigorously investigated by Storey especially since the factical reciprocity between the human being and animal life is made critically apparent throughout these early seminars and lectures.

II.

Heidegger’s 1929-1930 lecture course, \textit{Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics} (FCM), approaches the theme of life through the lens of \textit{Being and Time} by revisiting the distinction between world (\textit{Welt}) and surrounding world (\textit{Umwelt}). Storey provides an impressively comprehensive treatment of FCM beginning with the analysis of nothingness which is central to Heidegger’s often neglected account of boredom before retrieving his three infamous theses, “1. The stone is
worldless; 2. The animal is poor in world; 3. Man is world-forming” (Heidegger, *Fundamental* 184). It is the second thesis, namely that the animal is poor in world, which captures Storey’s attention since Heidegger rejects strict mechanism, i.e. the animal has no world, but does not embrace the same ontology of life privileged in the early lecture courses. Instead of returning to Heidegger’s account of worldhood in *Being and Time*, Storey decisively claims that FCM reflects Heidegger’s own pre-*Being and Time* investigations into life and animals. However, as I shall argue below, FCM does not represent a retrieval of lost beginnings but instead reflects a new path in his thinking, metontology.⁴

Heidegger envisioned metontology as a deconstruction of metaphysics by critically engaging such figures as Kant, Leibniz, Uexküll, and Nietzsche in order to arrive at renewed understanding of the temporal horizon of being. Therefore, metontology represents a radical shift in Heidegger’s thinking away from the Dasein of fundamental ontology towards the epochal nature of being as such, i.e. how being discloses itself through history. This shift to metontology begins with a sustained reflection upon the ontological difference between being and beings for the sake of inaugurating a new overcoming of metaphysics. Heidegger’s engagement with Uexküll thus occurs within this historical context and Storey’s critical assessment of evolution, hierarchy, and the human-animal divide deserves an acknowledgement of the relevance of Heidegger’s own metontological path.

Beginning with Heidegger’s omission of Darwin and the theme of evolution from his corpus, Storey concurs with Frank Schalow’s assessment that his dismissal of evolution was primarily motivated by a phenomenological suspicion of materialism and the anti-Darwinist sympathies of Uexküll and von Baer. However, Storey rather hastily dismisses Heidegger’s own non-naturalistic account of history, the history of being, as a form of mythological thinking. While the history of being reflects Heidegger’s preoccupation with the onset of nihilism driving the progress of science and technology in the modern West, each epoch within the history of being always contains the possibility of its own overcoming. Although, Heidegger does not address the phenomenon of evolution *tout court*, he does indicate that each epoch within the history of being corresponds to how entities come to disclose themselves. Storey claims that this idea of *Ereignis* as possibility (*dynamis*), i.e. all natural entities have a proper potentiality of being to actualize or unfold, is never fully

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⁴ Heidegger describes metontology as the “turning around (*kehre*) where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent overcoming” (Heidegger, *Metaphysical* 158).
developed by Heidegger (92). However, one might instead argue, as Thomas Sheehan first does, that Ereignis is nothing other than Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotelian dynamis (Sheehan 534-542).

If we are to turn to Heidegger’s adoption of a hierarchy throughout his thinking, especially by those commentators who label him as an essentialist (Farrell Krell, Derrida, and Agamben), Storey importantly claims that their assumption is mistaken since they fail to differentiate between healthy and unhealthy hierarchies: “in the former, the higher embraces the lower and releases into wider communion, freeing it for possibilities it could not actualize on its own; the higher and the lower are interdependent, and both orders benefit—life is ‘enhanced.’ In the latter, the higher represses the lower and uses it for its own designs; life is exploited or devalued” (96). Since Heidegger appears to subscribe to at least some form of hierarchy, be it ontological or ontic, one might claim that Heidegger’s later turn to the fourfold is precisely such an instance of a healthy hierarchy whereby the four regions of earth, heavens, gods, and mortals are drawn together into a nearness that both preserves and protects their distance. Their interdependence might also reflect a continuity of nature (physis) that thereby enables an ontological kinship between mortals (Mitchell 211-258).

Perhaps the most vexing problem for Heidegger, the human-animal divide, inaugurated by the third thesis—the animal is poor in world, requires further investigation into the meaning of the surrounding world (Umwelt) by Storey. Animals, indeed all zoeta, inhabit this surrounding world, and we might consider the poverty of the animal as not a poverty of privation, a lack of world, but rather a poverty that conceals a richness or wealth of possibilities—too much world. Here Heidegger’s engagement with Uexküll should be considered in its Aristotelian context, especially since such a poverty or privation, indeed as a kind of lack (steresis) is nothing other than a dynamis or a possible space of meaning for how the world is to be disclosed. Storey consistently assumes Heidegger’s transposition of the animal to poverty without developing a critical remark provided by both Bruce Foltz and echoed by David Farrell Krell, namely that “zoe designates a particular character of physis within which self-emergence is intensified” (Foltz 132-33). Poverty thereby is not a deprivation as much as it is an intensification of life.

Another way of addressing this lacuna is by retrieving the account of facticity in the early lecture courses devoted to Aristotle. If we are to shift the focus of the investigation away from ontological deprivation and towards ontological excess as Heidegger claims at the conclusion of FCM, “Animality no longer stands in view with respect to poverty or world as such, but rather as a realm of beings which are manifest and thus call for a specific fundamental relationship toward them on our part” (Heidegger, Fundamental 276), it would behoove Storey to more concretely
investigate how their manifestation becomes inscribed by their finitude since animals and humans both belong in the region of mortals. Therefore, to more genuinely understand how this realm of being becomes manifest is to place the domain of animals within a temporal horizon. Storey rather hastily dismisses this claim by Heidegger as an abandonment of animality and a turn to nature and the law of the earth (172). However, even if this were the case, Heidegger never leaves the theme of animality completely behind. As Derrida reminds us, the theme of animality in its various guises as life (zoe) and spirit (anima) will reappear throughout Heidegger’s lecture courses of the 1930’s.⁵

Storey concludes his investigation of the human-animal divide with a transcendental turn towards Kant to claim that Heidegger’s philosophy of nature, indeed physis, is indebted to Kant’s notion of the sublime. Following Kant, Storey claims that any attempt to seek out a sufficient explanation of life finds itself caught between the Scylla of regulative and teleological principles, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of metaphysical and constitutive principles, on the other. The distinction between the kingdom of nature obeying fixed mathematical laws and the kingdom of ends oriented by regulative principles leaves no room for the dynamism of life. Hence, life remains in excess. Storey assumes that this excess of life is to be equated with the sublime “as a dimension of nature that exceeds our conceptual and categorical grasp” (104). However, Storey commits a category mistake by subscribing the realm of nature to the sublime since the sublime is not nature per se, but our judgment and accompanying perception of it.⁶

Heidegger’s notion of physis also cannot be held to this distinction since physis does not subtend the world, but provides for its emergence. Physis cannot simply operate in a transcendental way as a thing in itself, an unknowable Ding an sich, since physis is most elementally all that there is, including the singularity of the human Dasein. Although Heidegger’s 1934 essay, Origin of the Work of Art, may seem to hold to a distinction between world and earth, it is critically important that this distinction be maintained.

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⁵ Naas claims that both zoe and anima reappear in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics as force or violence (Gewalt) and the origin of Gewalt is physis. There is no escaping the entanglement of the animal with physis, even if physis is to be placed in a temporal horizon as Ereignis. Heraclitus’ own fragment about zoe in its self-emergent character as physis only intensifies to such a degree that Heidegger will come to identify physis with polemos. To follow the trail of these terms from zoe to physis to polemos throughout the 1930’s might also reinscribe naturalism in some rather disturbing ways with regard to Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism.

⁶ “Hence what is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect gets through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment” (Kant 106).
dualism be avoided or else one risks the possibility of remaining entrenched in metaphysics. Heidegger explores the conceptual boundaries of world and earth only in order to eventually twist free of them. Therefore, this turn to physis and the law of the earth should not be read as a retrieval as much as a deconstruction of Kant insofar as a temporal horizon for being is to be established.

III.

Heidegger’s engagement with metontology might be said to reach its culmination with Nietzsche. In the later chapters of his book, Storey turns to Nietzsche as a panacea to alleviate the errancy of Heidegger’s thinking about evolution, the hierarchy of value, and the human-animal divide. If Nietzsche’s thought is said to best accommodate a non-reductive naturalism, Storey leaves the reader with an intriguing conundrum, why not pursue Nietzsche’s philosophy of life all along? Although Storey claims that both Heidegger and Nietzsche converge on the same fundamental problem of life, only in Nietzsche’s conception of life do we find the most plausible direction for Heidegger’s earlier thinking and its contribution to environmental philosophy. While this claim is not surprising given Heidegger’s sustained engagement with Nietzsche, it remains critically important to carefully distinguish their definitions of life since the conception of life that Heidegger pursues in his engagement with Aristotle might be said to be radically different from the conception of life that defines Nietzsche’s own oeuvre.

While I have already addressed the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s definition of life, namely that it cannot be distinguished from a kind of primordial intentionality which applies to all living beings and thereby gives rise to their meaning-constituting function, does Nietzsche accommodate the same kind of phenomenological account of intentionality with regard to his definition of the will to power? If so, what distinguishes the phenomenology of Nietzsche from that of Aristotle, the first phenomenologist? Storey engages Nietzsche’s philosophy of life and his robust naturalism by turning to his philosophy of biology and developing five themes as a rejoinder to Heidegger, namely his interpretation of Darwin, his treatment of teleology, his introduction of drives, his account of value, and his understanding of selection.

First, it should be noted that Nietzsche’s familiarity with Darwin, as Storey rightfully claims, does not stem from reading Darwin himself, but rather from second-hand sources, including Herbert Spencer and a number of Darwin’s critics. In agreement with Gregory Moore’s view, Nietzsche’s engagement with Darwin’s theory of evolution and hence the development of his will to power might be said to replicate Spencer’s view more than Darwin’s insofar as “the will to power is a development from
the simple to the complex, and takes place...on a cosmic scale” (182). While evolution develops as a dialectical process through “the survival of the fittest” leading to the subsequent perfection of the organism, there is an underlying teleology and even moral perfectionism which Nietzsche detects in Darwin’s account of the evolution culminating in the human form. This inherent anthropocentric teleology causes Nietzsche to diverge from Darwin since the will to power does not have a prescribed limit or end culminating in the human but continues to refine itself throughout all life forms in “an ever more thrifty and more far-seeing economy which achieves more and more with less and less force” (184).

Nietzsche’s development of the will to power naturally leads to his account of drives. Here Nietzsche comes closest to Heidegger in developing a phenomenological account of intentionality which reflects the activities of a) interpretation and b) autopoiesis. Although Nietzsche rather boldly claims that interpretation is the primary function of the will to power and hence its meaning-constituting activity, “The will to power interprets—it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed: it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power...In fact, interpretation is a means of becoming master of something” (185) is Nietzsche guilty of a latent anthropocentrism or does interpretation indeed arise as a function of the organism, the expression of its will to power? Second, to avoid this charge, and pursue the will to power as arising from the simple, as Nietzsche intends, we might turn to an even more originary activity, the process of autopoiesis that occurs at the most basic cellular level.

The paradigm [of an autonomous system] is a living cell. The constituent process in this case are chemical; their recursive interdependence takes the form of a self-producing, metabolic network that also produces its own membrane; and this network constitutes the system as a unity in the biochemical domain and determines a domain of possible interactions with the environment. This kind of autonomy in the biochemical domain is known as autopoiesis (197).

It is here that we can return to Heidegger to discern whether his account of the primordial intentionality which constitutes factical life satisfies the criteria of autopoetic directedness, on the one hand, and the sense-making activity of interpretation, on the other. If Nietzsche’s account of the will to power satisfies both criteria, then we might argue that the phenomenological differences between Nietzsche and Heidegger are relatively minor. Although Storey carefully summarizes Heidegger’s account of primordial intentionality throughout the early lecture courses of the 1920s, he neglects to develop the possibility that Heidegger’s view of factical life may in fact be connected to his view of animality (37). Here facticity represents the space of convergence between interpretation and autopoiesis and thereby accommodates an environmental ethics that
includes all living beings from the uni-cellular to the human Dasein. In spite of this oversight, Storey’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power rather curiously guarantees a place for facticity, especially the values placed upon the world by determinate wills, as the \textit{sine qua non} foundation for an ontology of life. In what follows, I shall conclude with some preliminary remarks concerning what Storey’s retrieval of Heidegger and Nietzsche might mean for the future of environmental philosophy.

In the final chapter of his book, Storey aims to explain how the non-reductive naturalism intimated by Heidegger and Nietzsche provides a conceptual foundation for environmental ethics. Storey submits that their naturalism might support a hierarchical biocentrism, “which recognizes the value of all living things while maintaining that higher, more complex forms of life embody greater value” (217). Following the path of integral ecology, Storey identifies a fundamental paradox of the environmental movement, namely that many environmentalists value nature but endorse a value-free view of nature. Both horns of this paradox are nihilistic since they assume a non-normative conception of nature (231-232). Storey claims that Nietzsche successfully evades this problem since his view of nature allows for some normative measure of subjectivity and valuation to non-human animals. However, Storey does not concretely specify how Nietzsche might go about assigning a normative system of ethics to non-human animals. If subjectivity is to be granted by their capacity for valuation, how are competing interests to be adjudicated? Surely Nietzsche would not grant that the interests of all non-human animals are equal or for that matter worthy of the same consideration. Storey’s application of the normative language of interests to Nietzsche does not clearly distinguish him from the utilitarianism he so skillfully disparages throughout the \textit{Genealogy of Morals}.\footnote{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft The viewpoint of utility is as remote and inappropriate as it possibly could be in face of such a burning eruption of the highest-rank ordering, rank-defining value judgments\textquoteright\textquoteright (Nietzsche, \textit{Genealogy} 26).}

While Storey claims that we ought to choose Nietzsche as the most viable option for an environmental ethics since his account of nature ultimately supplements Heidegger’s own thinking by incorporating evolutionary theory and retaining the depth dimension of traditional views of nature (233-234), we are led to wonder whether this claim genuinely honors the intentions of Nietzsche’s own thinking? Even if we are to assume that Nietzsche adopts his own form of Darwinism by incorporating evolutionary theory into his will to power thereby providing a continuum between humans and animals and establishing a basis for their subjective and indeed normative valuation, does Nietzsche subscribe to a traditional view of nature that is ultimately intelligible?
One might claim that it was precisely an excess of intelligibility, specifically the predominance of evolutionary theory—the naturalizing of humanity—that awakened Nietzsche from his own dogmatic slumber and fostered his suspicion of grand narratives. If evolutionary theory is just another grand narrative alongside Christianity, the intelligibility of nature by natural selection or divine providence is contested in the *Gay Science* where Nietzsche writes, “the total character of the world […] is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms” (Nietzsche, *Gay Science* 109). Nietzsche’s affirmation of nature as an unintelligible phenomenon is clearly appropriated by Heidegger throughout his own investigations into the meaning of being as *physis*. Here Nietzsche and Heidegger converge upon Heraclitus’ conception of nature as an errant movement of becoming which cannot be comprehended by simple perception, but only by interpretation. While such an errancy might be disavowed as an affirmation of nihilism, it is such an errancy that paradoxically provides the space for Nietzsche’s own cosmic thinking, “whoever looks at himself as into vast space and carries galaxies within himself, also knows how irregular galaxies are; they lead into the chaos and labyrinth of existence” (180).

It is undoubtedly this kind of cosmic thinking that is most desperately needed throughout Storey’s own treatment of Heidegger and Nietzsche. If we are to move beyond the anthropocene age that humanity has imposed upon the earth, we might do well, as Storey suggests, to choose Nietzsche in the long-term. However, the emergency of our ecological predicament also calls for a more radical retrieval of Heidegger’s own thinking. How are we to prepare ourselves for the emergency of being in a world confronted by such an imminent ecological transition? After all, it is Heidegger who reminds us at the conclusion of *FCM* that “the human being is enraptured in this *transition* and therefore essentially absent…only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment…in which we also experience what the world is” (Heidegger, *Fundamental* 366). This essential absence that marks the human condition is only increased by our profound lack of attention to the present and indeed the presence of the world as earth. Reclaiming the historicity of the past and anticipating the promise of the future remain the fateful seduction of our ever-increasing technological age. Perhaps we have not reached a more critical stage in Heidegger’s history of being than in the looming ecological crisis confronting humanity today. If we could only learn to dwell in the present by affirming the terror that overcomes us as mere *mortals*, we might then finally find the courage to sing Zarathustra’s own ‘intoxicated song’ and remain faithful to the earth.
Works Cited


