Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology and the Problem of Animal Life



While Heidegger privileges the role of language (logos) as the condition for being-in-the-world, the fundamental ontology ignores how logos is informed by our bodily comportment to the world as animals. This capacity for logos ultimately depends upon the capacities we share with members of other animal species. Although Aristotle privileges logos as distinctive to the human being, logos also maintains an aporetic relationship to the other capacities of the soul. If we are to reexamine Heidegger’s debt to Aristotle, we might begin by retrieving Heidegger’s interpretation of logos as an ontological problem for distinguishing Dasein from animal life.


Continental Philosophy; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Aristotle; logos; animal; life

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22329/p.v2i2.244

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